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is best understood as an epistemic requirement for argument, 
and (ii) once understood epistemically, the dialectical tier 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Manifest Rationality (2000) and other work (1996 and 2003), Ralph 
Johnson defends what he calls a “two-tiered” conception of argument, 
comprising of an illative core (of premises and conclusions) and a 
dialectical tier (of replies to objections). Johnson holds that his two-
tiered model for argument is necessary, because with argument, we are 
out to persuade an interlocutor with an act of manifest rationality. That 
is, an argument’s objective is not only to rationally persuade, but for the 
rationality of that persuasion to be clear to the persuaded. It must not 
only be a rational inference from the reasons to the target claim, but that 
move must also be clearly rational. And so, “the practice of 
argumentation is best understood as an exercise in manifest rationality” 
(2000, p. 1). 
Johnson’s view that arguments must have a dialectical tier has 
been the target for a number of objections, three of which I will consider 
here. The first is that there is no obvious connection between the 
dialectical tier and the rationality of the illative core of argument (as 
argued by Ohler, 2003 and Liang & Xie, 2011). The second is that the 
dialectical tier is argumentatively supererogatory; it is not a dialectical 
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obligation (as argued by Adler 2004). Third, and finally, it has been 
objected that the dialectical tier yields a vicious regress (as argued by 
Govier 1999). 
This paper’s two-part thesis is that with an account of epistemic 
defeat and defeater-defeat, it is possible to explain why arguments, if 
they are to provide hearers with justification for accepting a conclusion, 
must have a dialectical tier. Once this epistemic notion of dialectical 
considerations is in place, it is possible to answer the three pressing 
objections to Johnson’s dialectical tier. As a consequence, it is best to 
take the dialectical tier to be one derived from the epistemic normativity 
of argument. 
 
2. THE DIALECTICAL TIER AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
Johnson’s notion of the dialectical tier is dependent on his commitment 
that argument is an exercise in manifest rationality. An act is manifestly 
rational when it is not only rational, but it seems to all the relevant 
parties to the act that it is rational, too. Johnson explains with regard to 
argument, in particular: 
 
What is distinctive of argumentation is that it is an exercise in 
manifest rationality, by which I mean not only that a good 
argument is itself a rational product – a product of reasons, 
reasoning, and reasoners – but that it is part of the nature of 
the enterprise that this product appear as rational as well 
(2000, p. 144) 
 
One may see this notion of argument arising from a requirement of 
respecting the dignity of others with whom one disagrees and thereby 
with whom one must argue – one must first see them, insofar as one 
takes it one can argue with them, as rational and movable by reason. 
Further, one must take it that if they are rational and moved by reasons, 
they, by their own lights, have been moved to their views (even if 
wrong) by reasons. Johnson makes this thought explicit by requiring of 
any theory of argument that it be able to recognize that for any view, 
there can be good arguments for and against it (2000, p. 53). What 
manifest rationality requires, then, is that those reasons be sorted in a 
way that allows them to be seen as reasons but also provides accessible 
reason to those who have disagreed for going one way and not another. 
In light of the connection between this notion of manifest 
rationality and the view that argumentation must countenance 
conflicting reasons, the dialectical tier is a requirement of successful 
argument. Johnson’s definition of argument bears this out: 
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An argument is a type of discourse or text … in which the 
arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of the truth of a thesis 
by producing the reasons that support it. In addition to this 
illative core, an argument possesses a dialectical tier in which 
the arguer discharges his dialectical obligations (2000, p. 168) 
 
With the illative core, Johnson holds there must be “a premise-
conclusion structure: a set of premises in support of some other 
proposition that is the conclusion” (2000, p. 150). With the dialectical 
tier, the arguer must “address standard objections” and “alternate 
positions” (2000, p. 125 and p. 328). Tying the dialectical tier to the 
notion of manifest rationality, Johnson explains: 
 
[I]f the arguer takes seriously the positions of others and in 
the course of his own argument addresses himself to them, the 
result is a display that is not only rational, but is one that 
appears to be rational (2000, p. 151). 
 
In short, the dialectical tier is in the service of the manifestness of 
manifest rationality, the clarification and exemplification of the 
rationality of accepting the conclusion on the basis of the premises. 
Johnson’s case for the dialectical tier, then, may be stated as follows:  
 
Premise 1: Arguments must be exercises of manifest 
rationality. 
Premise 2: Arguments are manifestly rational only if they have 
a dialectical tier. 
Therefore, arguments must have a dialectical tier. 
 
Stated as such, the argument is valid, and Johnson’s reasons for holding 
the premises are clear. For Premise 1, argument’s objective is of rational 
persuasion, which requires the rationality of the terms of persuasion to 
themselves be clear to those persuaded. For Premise 2, clarity of this 
sort is possible only if one’s worries, misgivings, objections, and 
clarifying questions are answered. The dialectical tier is the function of 
making the rationality of accepting an argument’s conclusion manifest. 
The three objections to the dialectical tier are best as targeting 
the premises of Johnson’s case. First, one may object to Premise 1 on the 
grounds that good arguments need not be manifestly rational, but only 
rational. To have good arguments that one has a good argument is to ask 
more than what is required for argument. Alternately, one may object to 
Premise 2. One may do so in two ways. On the one hand, one may hold 
that there is no clear connection between the dialectical tier and 
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manifesting rationality – that chasing down and answering objections 
actually impedes that goal. On the other hand, one may object that the 
dialectical tier sets before us a task that is impossible to complete – 
since for every objection answered, there must be an argument, which 
will need to answer yet further objections. With this insight, we have a 
rough taxonomy of objections to the dialectical tier. 
 
Objections to the Dialectical Tier 
 / \ 
 To Premise 1 To Premise 2 
 / / \ 
 Reject Manifestness No Connection to Manifestness Regress Problem 
 
My plan is to review these objections in order.  First, one may object to 
the dialectical tier because one sees manifestness of rationality as, 
instead of an obligation of argument, rather as something that is 
supererogatory. Johnathan Adler has argued that the dialectical tier is 
still an “imperfect duty” one has to oneself and one’s view, but 
disagreements from others is not a defeater for arguments. The 
dialectical tier, then, “impos(es) excessively burdensome costs on 
arguers” (2004, p. 281). Human inquiry, Adler holds, must be bound by 
the demands for economizing, and this means that there must be a 
division of epistemic labour, so our arguments need only be appropriate 
for the time and resources we have at hand. Fulfilling the dialectical tier, 
then, would “diminish the vitality of argument and inquiry” (2004, p. 
284). 
The second objection to the dialectical tier is to Premise 2 along 
the lines that the dialectical tier has not obvious connection to the 
rationality of the support the conclusion has by the premises. 
Addressing objections that, by hypothesis, are unfounded or do not 
affect the argument’s quality is not only a misuse of one’s time and 
efforts, but it is actually contrary to the spirit of the manifestness of the 
rationality of the support. Amy Ohler captures this objection, noting 
that: 
 
To have to respond to criticism believed or known to be 
misguided is in one important sense of the word irrational 
(2003, p. 70). 
 
Jonathan Adler, too, holds that this line of thought yields an absurd 
notion of what the argument must achieve. 
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[A]n arguer is entitled to dismiss objections that he regards – 
and for good reason – as failing, without having to explain why 
it fails (2004, p. 289). 
And further, Liang and Xie hold that the dialectical tier doesn’t lead to 
improved or clarified rationality, since addressing bad, or low-quality, 
objections is “unlikely to affect the cogency of our argument” (2011, p. 
233). As a consequence, the objection is that the dialectical tier adds 
nothing to the argument’s quality, but it stands to obscure the 
connection between the premises and conclusions.  
Third and finally, the dialectical tier, it is objected, sets arguers 
on the road to a vicious regress. The argument for regress runs as 
follows (standardized for presentation): 
 
i. Every argument must have a dialectical tier. 
ii. Dialectical tiers are arguments (or have arguments as 
components) 
iii. Therefore, every dialectical tier must have a dialectical 
tier. 
iv. Therefore, every argument has an infinite number of 
dialectical tiers. 
 
Trudy Govier concludes that “Johnson’s view seems to imply an infinite 
regress” (1999, pp. 232-3). On the assumption that giving a successful 
argument is a finite task, line 4 of the argument is absurd, and so we 
have a reductio of the dialectical tier. As Govier puts it, “surely it is not 
plausible to say that an arguer has an obligation to put forward an 
infinite number of arguments in order to build a good case for a single 
conclusion!” (1999, p. 233). 
 
3. EPISTEMIC DEFEAT AND THE STRUCTURE OF OBJECTION AND 
REPLY 
 
A successful case for an epistemic reading of the dialectical tier must 
address three issues.  First, an account of what objections and replies 
are on an epistemic theory must be clear. So, an epistemic view of what 
the dialectical tier is must be manifest. Second, the epistemic theory 
must be shown to be pursuant of the broader objective of manifest 
rationality in argument. Third, the epistemic theory of the dialectical tier 
must have successful replies to the three standing objections. 
The epistemic view of the dialectical tier depends on an account 
of the relationship between (a) inferential justification, (b) epistemic 
defeaters, and (c) defeat of defeaters. To begin, inferential epistemic 
justification is the status of a belief or commitment has when it is 
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justified on the basis of some other commitment’s inferential support. 
This, for argument, is the illative core – conclusions are supported by 
premises and the appropriate logical relation they have bearing on it. 
Once a commitment is justified by the inferential support 
another justified commitment provides, new information can defeat that 
support. With this new information, the support that the premise 
provides for the conclusion can be eliminated. Here is a rough notion of 
what a defeater is: 
 
D is a defeater for a subject S’s justification for holding that a 
proposition P is true on the basis of evidence E iff: (i) D is true 
or justified for S, and (ii) if D were added to S’s evidence E, S 
would no longer be justified in holding that P. 
 
Importantly, defeat can come in two forms, because we can no longer be 
justified in holding a proposition in two ways: either that justification is 
eliminated by new information but the proposition’s truth value 
remains in question, or the proposition is shown to be false for reasons 
that are better than (or perhaps equal to) the support of the initial 
justification. And so, there are two types of defeat: 
 
D is an undercutting defeater iff D is a defeater that eliminates 
S’s justification (but P’s truth value remains indeterminate in 
light of D) 
 
D is a rebutting defeater iff D is a defeater that provides S with 
reasons to hold that P is false 
 
An example will help keep the two kinds of defeater distinct. Let S hold 
that P on the basis of some attester A’s say-so. S’s evidence E, then, is 
this testimony. An undercutting defeater for E’s support of P would be 
the information that A has some motive to lie about P. A’s motive to lie 
about P isn’t itself evidence that P is false, but it certainly eliminates our 
justification for holding that P on the basis of A’s say-so. Alternately, let 
there be some powerful evidence, perhaps some undoctored 
photograph or video provided by a very reputable source that Q is true 
(and Q is a contrary of P). Now, S’s justification for holding that P is 
defeated, because S now has reason to believe that P is false. This second 
form of defeat is rebutting defeat. 
Objections can come along the lines of challenges to premises, 
illation, clarity, and to the conclusion. Insofar as reasons to consider 
defeat (of one of the two kinds) immanent, we can take the following 
complex to represent the possibilities for objection-types. 
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 Premise Illation Clarity Conclusion 
Undercutting     
Rebutting     
 
For example, one can provide undercutting reasons or rebutting 
objections against the conclusions of an argument (as we have seen 
above), or one could provide those objections against whether the 
premises are acceptable. Additionally, one can show that one does not 
have sufficient grasp on how clearly the premises support the 
conclusion or that it is positively clear that they do not. Every one of 
these sets of objections may be stated as a form of defeater for the 
justification a subject may have for holding the target proposition or 
conclusion as true. 
Replies, then, must show that the target proposition (or some 
properly precisified version of it) is justified, even in light of the 
standing objection. These, too, may be rebutting or undercutting in 
form. And so: 
 
R is a reply in defence of S’s holding that P on the basis of E 
(with defeater D) iff were R and D are added to E, S would 
have justification for holding that P is true. 
 
Replies, given the way justification can arise from the coordination of 
defeat and new information, can come in two forms. 
 
R is a restoring reply iff were R and D are added to E, S’s 
justification for holding P is true would solely be on E 
 
R is a reestablishing reply iff were R and D are added to E, S’s 
justification for holding that P is true would arise with R’s new 
information 
 
To clarify these, let us return to the defeater case from before. Let S 
believe that P on the basis of some attestor A’s say-so. If we had the 
defeating reason D to hold that A had motive to lie, we would call this an 
undercutting case of defeat. However, our justification for D itself could 
be undercut by R, perhaps showing that our source for the belief that A 
has a conflict is confused and had wrongly misnamed A as an unreliable 
source. Or we could find some rebutting evidence, perhaps showing that 
A has no conflict of interest in this case. In either way, we would restore 
our original justification. Alternately, we may find some other line of 
reasoning to P, perhaps along the lines of some more credible attesters 
to P, which would be a form of reestablishing justification. 
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The point of this taxonomy is to show that accounts of epistemic 
defeat and defeaters of defeat provide a model for how objections and 
replies may be aligned and assessed. Moreover, it provides a way of 
explaining not only the rationality of the process of objection and reply, 
but it explains what makes this exercise of rationality itself manifestly 
rational. 
Manifestness arises from this nexus of objections and replies 
because if an arguer provides a hearer with reasons to accept P as true, 
but if the hearer has an objection, even if unjustified, the hearer is not 
rational in accepting p unless and until the hearer sees that the 
objection does not defeat the conclusion. And so, for the sake of manifest 
rationality, not only in the arguing, but in the hearer’s being rationally 
persuaded, the arguer must address first the hearer’s objections and, 
second, the objections the hearer would likely encounter in similar 
critical discussions. The activity and its product must not only be 
rational, in proportioning belief to evidence, but it should also appear as 
rational to those participating. So objections must be answered, and 
epistemic models of defeat and reply explain why this is so. 
 
4. DEFENDING THE DIALECTICAL TIER 
 
The final stage of the case for an epistemic reading of the dialectical tier 
is showing that the epistemic model of defeat and reply allows for 
successful defence against the three prominent objections surveyed 
earlier. To the objection to the dialectical tier not having a tight 
connection to manifest rationality (that is, to the second premise), the 
epistemic theory is that if we are to take ourselves to be justifying our 
commitments with argument and yielding rational change of view as we 
exchange reasons, then replies to objections must be part of the process. 
This is because a failure to reply to an objection, even if the objection is 
unfounded, does not defeat the defeater in the eyes of the person 
wielding the objection. This, for the objector, then nevertheless has 
justification defeated. Insofar as the objective of argument is manifest 
rationality, showing the rationality of a line of reasoning, then replies to 
objections is an intrinsic feature of the project. 
For those who hold that the dialectical tier and manifestness is 
supererogatory (as does Adler) or that it is actually contrary to the 
exercise of rationality (as does Ohler and Xie & Liang), a distinction is in 
order. Let a speaker S be challenged by a hearer H about one of S’s 
commitments, P. H knows enough about the domain of discourse 
concerning P to provide some concerns about P’s truth, and H calls 
attention to them. S, in this case, is very knowledgeable about the 
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domain and has been aware of the concerns H has raised for quite some 
time, and S is also aware of reasons not to take those too seriously, but 
rather to focus on the high-quality evidence E that supports P. Let’s also 
stipulate that E, even despite H’s concerns, supports P. In this case, from 
S’s perspective, worrying about H’s objections is pointless, and so it 
would be irrational to address them or give them more attention. But 
from H’s perspective, these seem to be serious defeaters, and S’s not 
addressing them seems intransigent dogmatism. 
In one sense, S’s argument from E to P is satisfactory, and is 
considerably more efficient than one that must engage in a dialectical 
tier with H’s concerns. But in another sense, S would fail at achieving the 
interactive and communicative goal of argument, giving H reasons H can 
herself recognize as good reasons to accept P as true. Call the first sense 
of argumentative success the absolute notion – one does not need to look 
to an audience to assess whether the argument is good. Call the second 
sense of argumentative success the relational notion – one must look to 
audiences and the intellectual milieu to determine whether the 
argument is appropriate. 
The absolute notion of argumentative quality is certainly 
logically prior to the absolute notion, as one cannot help but ask, when 
one evaluates an argument, whether one accepts the argument 
absolutely. However, the relational notion is epistemically prior, since 
when one evaluates an argument for absolute quality, it is one’s own 
dialectical criteria (and then those of others) from which one evaluates 
an argument. The notion of relational quality depends on that of 
absolute quality (as one asks do the premises support the conclusion? 
internal to any evaluation). The notion of relational quality depends on 
that of absolute quality, but we cannot help but start from that of a 
relational perspective, namely, that of our own set of acceptable 
premises and what relevancies are manifest. 
Insofar as we take the Gricean cooperative elements of 
communication in argument – that of producing reasons we think 
warranted, relevant, of an appropriate quantity, and of a manner 
accessible to our audience – are in the service of our collaborative 
weighing of reasons, the dialectical notion of argument seems an 
inescapable requirement. Arguments given without care for whether an 
audience accepts, understands, can keep track of the number, and can 
efficiently see the relevance of the premises are less arguments, and 
more instances of browbeating or hectoring. And, consequently, there 
are occasions where argumentative dialogues can become more 
sessions for information-sharing or inculcating a sense of what is 
relevant. Without these background conditions either in place or in the 
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process of being established, argument is destined for communicative 
failure. And so, even though the absolute notion of argument quality is 
what we must evaluate arguments in situ, those deployments 
themselves depend on the fact of the relational conception – we deploy 
the absolute conception of argument against our own background of 
competencies and knowledge, without which, we would not be able to 
see the argument’s quality. This is why argument must be an exercise of 
manifest rationality, and consequently, why there must be a dialectical 
tier. 
The final challenge is to answer the problem of the regress. If 
arguments must have dialectical tiers, and if tiers themselves are 
arguments, then we face a vicious regress of reasons. There is a variety 
of views about the epistemic regress problem, and each may provide a 
method for addressing this dialectical regress. If I am right that the 
dialectical tier is an epistemic phenomenon, then any structural feature 
of it that has an epistemic problem will have a parallel epistemic 
solution. In this case, given that the dialectical tier and requirements of 
manifest rationality are highly demanding parallels to epistemic 
internalism, epistemic internalism’s most significant problem will be a 
problem for argumentation theory – particularly, the problem of the 
regress of reasons. 
Sextus Empiricus’s Five Modes (PH 1.164) is the locus classicus 
for the regress challenge for justification (though it arguably is at work 
in Plato’s Meno 75d and Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 72b5). For any 
commitment, Sextus reasons, one may challenge it with disagreement 
(someone who denies it) or with relativity (some information that 
defeats the evidence by showing it is not connected to truths). Those 
holding the commitment must then reply with a reason, and to that 
reason, one may challenge again with disagreement or relativity. And so 
another reason must be given. Sextus held that one could go in of three 
patterns for the reasons: (i) one could end with commitments without 
supporting reasons, (ii) one could keep giving reasons without end, or 
(iii) one could argue in a circle. Sextus held that none of these options, 
which he had termed hypothesis, regress, and circularity, yielded a 
structure of justifying reasons, and so he concluded that there seems to 
be no way for our commitments to be justified. 
However, it seems there are many ways to solve Sextus’ 
trilemma. The first strategy of reply is foundationalism, the view that 
some reasons do not need to come in the form of arguments, but in the 
form of logical intuitions, experiences, or ethical impulses (see Freeman 
2003, p. 5 for an exemplary reply to Govier along these lines). 
Alternately, there may be benign circularity, as when commitments 
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come in coherent theoretical systems. Within a theoretical program, one 
may explain and predict phenomena, one may revise and refine the 
details of the views in light of new information. And so, instead of an 
argument, at some point the coherence of the system itself becomes a 
reply to challenges. 
Finally, there may be a more skeptical turn to our thoughts with 
the infinitist line with the regress – in particular, it may be the case that 
every argument is incomplete, all finite cases are necessarily leaving 
important critical questions unanswered. Perhaps it is not so absurd to 
think that arguments must often be opened up again, since there is 
always more to say. Surely, one must stop here or there, but that is for 
pragmatic reasons, not purely argumentative or epistemic purposes. We 
grow tired, bored, or hungry, and we let it go. Or sometimes, our 
audience finally comes around to agree, and so we leave off. But we 
always do so with a promise to keep talking if it arises that there are 
more questions later. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The takeaway from this discussion is that the dialectical tier is best 
conceived in terms of an epistemic feature of manifest rationality. We 
have the obligation to answer objections, because if we are to display 
the rationality of our commitments in a way that others can recognize, 
we must address concerns as rational. The nexus of epistemic defeat and 
varieties of justification-restoring and re-establishing reply provides a 
means of explaining why the dialectical tier is necessary for justification 
to be clear. Further, once the epistemic categories are in place, replies to 
the leading objections are not only possible, but are clear. 
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